The interdependence of collective memory and national identification has become a widespread scholarly axiom. While the related literature recognizes the role of memories of victimization and heroic victories, this article illustrates the importance of a 'semiotic balance' between these two for the maintenance of national identification. The study is based on an individual-centered quantitative method, which has never been used to investigate the national identity-memory nexus before. Using a survey with a representative sample (N=530) of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the association between individuals' memories and national identification is examined. It was found that remembering a combination of victory and victimization is a better predictor of national identification than either theme separately. These findings indicate the crucial importance of a balanced mythical structure that includes both themes of victimization and triumph.
Introduction
On May 2006, 'Azmi Bishara, then an Arab-Palestinian member of the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), delivered a speech at a party event commemorating the 58th year since the Nakbah, the destruction of Palestine in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In his speech, Bishara linked the Nakbah with another event: 'We have to convene every 15th of May to commemorate the Nakbah, and on the 23 rd of July to celebrate the answer to the Nakbah' (Kul-al-Arab 2006) . Bishara was referring to the 1952 Free Officers' revolution in Egypt, which toppled the pro-Western monarchy and established an Arab nationalist and anti-colonialist regime that set the tone in Arab politics for the next 15 years. Naming this event an 'answer to the Nakbah' requires some intellectual effort. The 1948 war resulted in the forced uprooting of at least 700,000 Palestinians and the eradication of hundreds of villages. While the revolutionary Egyptian regime was very sympathetic to the Palestinians in its rhetoric, it was not able to bring home even a single refugee. However, the July 23 revolution is popularly considered a victory for Arab nationalism, which contributed to a discursive change in the Arab world and, in the eyes of Bishara, partly restored a symbolic balance of victories and defeats, humiliation and pride.
Bishara's choice is a statement against the widely accepted convention that victimization is a central aspect of the Palestinian collective ethos (Oren, Bar-Tal & David 2004) . The underlying assumption behind the juxtaposition of these two events is the futility of constructing a stable and compelling national narrative in which the nation is primarily depicted as a subjugated entity. No matter how central a collective victimizing experience might be in the national narrative, a certain level of historical agency, or even victories, need to be added to the equation. This article puts this idea to an empirical test.
useful conceptual category analysis, beyond the particular case of Zionist commemoration.
Heroism, Victimization, Victories and Defeats
Zerubavel identified an inherent tension in national myths of martyrdom between the two poles of heroism and victimization (Zerubavel 1991) . While the first is identified with activism and self-empowerment, the second represents passivity and downplays the nation's power. Heroism is related to the sacrifice one makes to achieve national goals or ensure national survival. Emphasis on victimization in national conflicts, on the other hand, is based on beliefs about the justness of national goals, while emphasizing the evil of the opponents' goals and delegitimizing their characteristics (Frank 1967) .
Furthermore, since WWII, the international sphere has become a stage of competition over the status of 'victim' (Chaumont 2002) and victimhood has become an important universal form of moral capital.
The distinction between myths of heroism and victimization is between two ideal types.
In reality, the two complement each other, and every national myth merges elements from both. However, some events are remembered as almost ideal types. Genocides, such as the Jewish and Armenian holocausts, for example, are very close to the ideal type of victimization myths, even though a closer examination certainly would reveal a more intricate production of meanings.
This distinction, however, needs further refinement since heroic myths can be related to both victories and defeats. While heroic victories hold a central place in many national narratives and are frequently commemorated by major national holidays, some national 'heroic defeats' are also celebrated as evidence of the nation's ability to sacrifice -even without achieving a tangible goal. This is the case of the Battle of the Alamo myth in A distinct Palestinian identity can be traced back at least to the middle of the 19th century (Khalidi 1997; Kimmerling and Migdal 1993) or possibly even to the 17th century (Gerber 1998). The nationalization of this identity, however, did not begin until after WWI, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the British commitment to support the creation of a 'national home for the Jewish people' in Palestine (Khalidi 1997).
The 1948 war, which erupted on the heels of the United Nations' decision to partition It is therefore expected that individuals who ascribe high importance to historical events that are part of the public Palestinian national narrative will also tend to self identify as Palestinians more than other individuals. In addition, the research is expected to measure the peculiar contribution of victimization and victories for predicting of national identification.
Sample and Data Collection
The analysis is based on phone interviews with 530 It is noteworthy that the reliability of phone interviews among the Arab minority in Israel has been frequently criticized. It has been argued that Arab respondents are suspicious and tend to feel threatened when being asked questions with a potentially political connotation (especially by phone), and that their answers might reflect a tendency to satisfy the authorities (Smooha 1998).
As Smooha (1998) writes, in surveys he has taken since the mid-seventies, the high rate of support for the PLO (considered as a terrorist organization by Israeli law until 1993) and a long list of anti-establishment attitudes indicate that, collectively, the Arabs in Israel are not a frightened public. Nevertheless, the threat might be felt differentially by different segments of the population, and therefore, these concerns should be taken seriously.
It is possible that the sense of threat influenced the response rate and somewhat damaged the quality of the sample as representative. It should be noted, however, that the response rate in the Arab sample was higher than in the Jewish sample (only 29%), and therefore we should not overestimate the effect of political threat on response rate. In addition, in both samples, the response rate is compatible with the known response rate of phone interviews in Israel.
More serious, however, is the likelihood that some answers relating to especially sensitive issues (like the Nakbah), were influenced by the context of the interviews. For this reason, I would not suggest treating the descriptive findings, such as frequencies of respondents who mentioned the Nakbah, as representing 'reality'. The focus of this study, however, is not descriptive but correlative. Even if some respondents tended to downplay their memory of certain events or their national identification, there is still significant empirical value in any correlation found between the two. It is impractical to use factor analysis or reliability tests to validate these categories. With a few exceptions, the frequency of most events is too low and therefore only their aggregation by pre-defined criteria enables their use in any complex calculation. More than 40 events were mentioned, three quarters of which were mentioned by less than three percent of the sample. As a result, the co-appearance of different events is inevitably low. Respondents were limited to three events and therefore the analysis is based on the assumption that those who mentioned certain events are not the only respondents who remember them. Rather, they were the individuals who ascribed more importance to these events, and therefore they usually represent the 'tip of the iceberg' of wider circles of social memory.
To measure the explanatory power of memories for national identification I used a series of logistic regressions in which the self-labeling variables were used as dependent In the questionnaire it was measured by self-ranking of religious practice on a 1-4 Likert scale. In the model the variable was included as a dummy variable ("Highly" and "Very highly"=1). Table I presents the frequency of the various events mentioned by the respondents. Table   II Another particularly interesting finding is that respondents who mentioned Arab victories were significantly more likely to define themselves as both Palestinians and Israelis. One possible reason is that for those Arab citizens who are both proud Palestinians and seek ways to integrate into Israeli society as equal citizens, Israeli defeats at the hands of Arabs pave the way for imagining a more egalitarian interaction with Jews. It is somewhat similar to the triumphs of Arab soccer teams over Jewish teams which both contribute to boosting the collective self-esteem of the Arab-Palestinian minority and at the same time allow them to seek integration from a position of power (Sorek 2007). The most surprising and thought-provoking case is the high frequency of the IsraelHizballah confrontation in the summer of 2006, known in the Arab world as the July War and in the West and in Israel as the second Lebanon War. It was mentioned even more frequently than the 1948 war as among the three most important events in the history of the country (although not as the single most important event). However, we should be careful while interpreting the order of these two events since it is likely that mentioning of 1948 was affected by the political sensitivity of this event. It is not unlikely that faceto-face interviews would have led to a higher frequency of reference to the Nakbah. At the same time, the absolute frequency of the 2006 war is still impressive, regardless of whether or not it surpasses the Nakbah.
Findings
There might be several reasons for this finding, some of them circumstantial and the others more substantive. First, it is known that relatively recent events tend to be more accessible in human memory than older events. In a parallel Jewish sample, however, 
Concluding Remarks
There are several theoretical implications of this study. First, social memories of individuals might serve as an important predictor of their national identification. This finding fills a lacuna in the literature about memory and national identity, which so far assumes this relation without attempting to validate it empirically. To be sure, I do not argue for any causal order here. Collective memories are key elements of national identity and this is why they have partial power in predicting it. Second, both the nation- Serbia "…has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity" and therefore the event is celebrated as a "distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future". 2 Furthermore, phone interviews have an important advantage over face-to-face interviews and this should not be underestimated. In particular, it is much easier to monitor the activity of phone interviewers because they are more centrally located and supervised. Interviewers are typically paid by the hour or by questionnaire and are rarely permanent employees of the institute that hires them. Their commitment to their work, therefore, is usually not optimal. Based on personal experience and on well-known publicized cases in Israel, face-to-face interviews are more likely to be forged by the interviewers, and it is unknown how many published articles are corrupted by answers that have been falsified as a result of this forgery. 
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